Tag Archives: Memory

ESSENTIALLY HUMAN (2)

Imagination and AI 

My previous post on memory, imagination and creativity, bought some great replies both on-line and off (track back – they are worth looking at). Might these essentially human functions be lost to we humans and taken up by AI? It was this question that prompted a follow-up article.

There was a time in the latter part of the last century, when ‘false memory syndrome’ featured regularly in the press. This condition, now largely discredited, caused me to widen my view of memory. How it was possible to make up memories of events that did not happen? Could one imagine a trauma? And might there be a connection between memory and imagination? And if there were, might it explain the common occurrence of two siblings having vastly different memories of the same family event. Was one correct /true/solid and the other false, or were both, infused by personal idiosyncrasies, partly imagined? Might my own memory of pivotal events in the past swing with my present desires and circumstances and be altered by them? Might it be loyal primarily to them? 

These sorts of musings came to the fore while writing my fourth novel, The Prosperous Thief (2002), in which memory is central. While most of the narrative takes place in the present day, the long shadow of the Holocaust hovers over the lives of the characters. As soon as I’d finished the first draft, I visited Germany and Poland for the sort of idiosyncratic and instrumental research novelists do. 

One November day, I spent an afternoon walking the paths and woodlands of Auschwitz 2, Auschwitz-Birkenau; this is the site where most of the killing at Auschwitz occurred. Here is the familiar rail track with the long platform where it was decided who would die immediately and who would be allowed to live a little longer (the ‘selections’), here is the pointed-roof gatehouse, and here, inside the complex, are the long huts where people lived and suffered and died. It’s a huge area, and apart from two cyclists taking a short-cut through the former death-camp, and three Polish schoolboys pilfering some Yahrzeit candles,[1]this place of mass murder was deserted. 

I wandered the pretty woodlands still rosy with late autumn colour where over a half century earlier Jews were herded together, made to wait their turn for the gas chambers. I stood in the ruins of crematoria 2, 3, 4 and 5 where hundreds of thousands of men, women and children had been reduced to ash. I wandered the seemingly endless columns and rows of wooden huts where Jews were crammed onto wooden bunks: the sick, the dying, the starving, and the steadfastly surviving all tossed in together. 

I walked past several of these huts down to the memorial slotted between the ruins of Crematoria 2 and 3. This is the International Monument to the Victims of Auschwitz. Built in 1967 in Soviet brutalist style, it consists of huge cement blocks in a geometric pile. In front of the blocks and set into the horizontal brickwork are plaques carrying the terrible statistics. This unimaginative monument is big and strikingly unbeautiful and, to my mind, communicated nothing about this terrible place. It was also totally unnecessary: this place, this Birkenau, was memorial enough. 

That visit to Auschwitz-Birkenau occurred twenty-five years ago, but I can still see the autumn colours and the school boys, I can hear the crunch of my shoes on paths made of gravel mixed with shards of human bone, I can smell the autumn mulch, I can recall my sorrow and anger and bafflement as I wandered that death-filled landscape. But of course I don’t ‘see’, I don’t ‘hear’ and I don’t ‘smell’, I imagine these impressions. And, as well, I add to them. I find myself musing on human brutality and prejudice, and what turns ordinary men into monsters; I think of the crimes that are committed in the name of patriotism and nationalism; I think of Trump and his MAGA movement; I think of the destruction of Gaza and the homeless Palestinian people. When I now remember my visit to Auschwitz, rather than a set of immutable images, I experience a far more impressionistic, complex event, one that acknowledges the numerous books I’ve read about Nazi Germany and the Holocaust, the films I’ve seen, the conversations I’ve had, the visits I’ve made to other parts of central Europe, values I hold, my knowledge of other horrors. My original visit to Auschwitz has become far richer in recollection, in that my entire cognitive landscape – experience, study, conversations, other memories, and fresh reasoning – has been recruited. 

This is how the imagination works. It shapes a memory that is fluid and intense and illuminating. It is also unpredictable: you cannot determine beforehand what knowledge and experience will be pulled into play during recollection, nor the ideas that will emerge from the mix. And it is unreliable, too. As a photo is not the whole story, that there is, as Barthes wrote, a ‘blind field beyond the frame’; so too with memory. All memory involves partial forgetting (outside the frame), and within the frame are new considerations, as my memories of Auschwitz show. Memory is rarely, if ever, static, nor is it neutral. We select what is to be remembered, and depending on the prevailing circumstances, what is selected this year will be different from what will be selected next year or in ten years. Far from being solid and immutable, this memory we trust is both delicate and infinitely corruptible, it is also free-ranging and expansive, linking with a swill of experience, desire, emotion, understanding, doubts, values and attitudes. 

Monuments provide a useful example to both the protean nature of memory and that it is never neutral. Memory, exactly what is remembered of a past event/desire/person is always in service to current values/desires/propaganda/politics. When monuments are built to mark pivotal events in a nation’s past, or to memorialise individuals killed in wars or terrorist attacks or murdered through genocide, there is an implicit assumption of an enduring, unchanging memory and commemoration. But the recent avalanche of falling statues of statesmen from the past who were involved in the slave trade or the murder of indigenous peoples is testimony to how changing values and culture affect how and what is remembered from history.

It was around the time I went to Auschwitz that I first put into words what should have been obvious to me and all those writers, visual artists, musicians, theoretical physicists, and mathematicians engaged in creative work (i.e. new work and ideas that have never existed before), that memory, fertile and changing memory, creative and illuminating memory, is an imaginative process, one dependent on the imagination and in turn constructing it.[2]

Which brings me to AI.[3] AI is an expert problem solver. In addition, having been ‘fed’ the contents of the web, AI can answer almost any question put to it – though not without mistakes. (There’s the oft-told story about an AI asked how to combat climate change, replied: ‘eradicate humans’ – not so much a mistake, because this would certainly work for climate change, but ignoring a number of other fairly essential issues.) Solving problems and answering questions is a matter of accessing already-existing data, it is not creative, nor does it necessarily demonstrate understanding. Understanding is different from thinking. Thinking is not the same as reasoning. And reasoning is not the same as creating.

What would an AI make of ‘the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart’? Metaphor courses from the imagination. An effective metaphor is tangential to reality; it extends the meaning of that reality. Metaphor illuminates, it goes beyond the immediately obvious, beyond routine understanding.

Below are few more examples of metaphor – perhaps too many, but I do delight in metaphor

– Bernice Rubens: SPRING SONATA: ‘she tried to insinuate herself into the quicksands of her mother’s skin’

– Steiner in REAL PRESENCES: ‘memorising forms the ballast of the self.’

– John Banville’s THE UNTOUCHABLE: p.83. ‘The couple who ran the place were out of a seaside postcard, she a big blancmange with a wig of brass curls, he a lean little whippet of a fellow with a Hitler tash and a tic in one eye.’

– Toibin’s THE MASTER p.20 ‘the great flat foot of the public.’

– Auschwitz: ‘the eternal failure of all mankind’

– Virginia Woolf: ‘ideas are the only efficient air-raid shelter.’ (Essay: Thoughts on peace in an air Raid)

– Dorothy Porter: ‘In love I have no style. My heart is decked out in bright pink tracksuit pants.’  (THE MONKEY’S MASK)

‘The ripe teenage mulch of his bedroom.’ Ian McEwan. SATURDAY. p. 30

About Baxter: ‘that unpickable knot of affliction.’ p.272 ibid

‘You are like a tin of mixed biscuits.’ Iris to Carrington in Holroyd’s Strachey p. 352

Amichai OPEN CLOSED OPEN: ‘Enchanted places are the opiates of my life’  (69)

Zygmunt Bauman. LIQUID LOVE: p. 8 ‘Love is a mortgage loan drawn on an uncertain, and inscrutable future.’

Leibniz took music to be ‘God’s algebra’.  (Steiner ERRATA, p.75)

Edith Wharton. THE TOUCHSTONE. (P.110) ‘Vanity contents itself with the coarsest diet; there is no palate so fastidious as that of self-distrust.’

Mohsin Hamid. THE RELUCTANT FUNDAMENTALIST. (p.71) ‘Nostalgia was their crack cocaine… and my childhood was littered with the consequences of their addiction: unserviceable debts, squabbles over inheritances, the odd alcoholic or suicide.’

Sebastian Barry THE SECRET SCRIPTURE

p. 70 ‘We have neglected the tiny sentences of our life.’

p. 72 ‘There was a cold cheap cankered-looking moon…’

AI can regurgitate the OED, it can rearrange the OED, but can it go outside definition to metaphor? And what about art, art like Rothko’s, could an AI have produced that? Rothko was original. There was nothing that came before him that could be seen as feeders to Rothko’s extraordinary paintings. The same could be said for Cezanne and, more recently, those wildly evocative furry sculptures of Kathy Temin. Original art appears to come out of nowhere – where ‘nowhere’ is a unique human imagination. Could AI produce never-before-seen art, never-before-imagined art? And then there’s music. The great composers we revere today, wrote music that surprised and often shocked at the time. It was new, and it seemed that nothing had prepared their contemporaries for this music. I’ve heard music produced by AI. It’s nice enough but it does not have the shock value of a Gershwin who combined classical with jazz, or Schoenberg’s 12-tone music, or the uncanny transcendence of Bach’s music for solo piano and the cello suites.

The hearty spruikers of AI often refer to science when promoting AI’s skills, and certainly when it comes to medical science, AI has proved very useful, as it has with coding. But what about theoretical science? Could AI have hypothesized a nuclear chain reaction as did Leo Szilard as he crossed Southampton Row in London in 1938? And much of Einstein’s work had to wait decades before his theoretical, which is to say imaginative work, could be grounded in reality. Or Lisa Meitner’s extraordinary imaginative leap that lead to nuclear fission?

In the arts, in literature, in music and in theoretical physics, the imagination has produced work that comes from way outside the boundaries of current knowledge, current understanding, current reasoning, and previous imagining. Can AI do that?

_________________________________________________________________________________

And while I’m here, you may be interested in the following EVENT

1. I will be in conversation with Susan Wyndham about her latest book, the biography of the enigmatic Elizabeth Harrower, The Woman in the Watchtower. Susan is the former literary editor of the Sydney Morning Herald; she has worked as a foreign correspondent, has written a range of non-fiction, she is an excellent interviewer herself – I know from personal experience – and is a regular at all the literary festivals. Her new book is fascinating. This should be a terrific event.

When: Thursday, November 27th
Where: The Hill of Content, Bourke Street, Melbourne
Time: 6-7pm
Bookings essential: If this link doesn’t work, the link is on the Hill of Content website.


[1] I was furious. It was an affront to all who’d been murdered here, and all who had come to remember them. These boys were stealing memorial candles. I yelled at them as I ran towards them. They dropped the candles and fled.

[2] In recent years, the correlation has been given a neuroscientific basis. Demis Hassabis, neuroscientist, all-round genius, and winner of the 2023 Nobel Prize of Chemistry, published a paper in 2007 in which he linked memory and the imagination. He revealed that similar brain activity occurred during tasks employing memory of the past and tasks requiring an imagining of the future, and both were grounded in the hippocampus. Since then, much further work has been done in the neurological connections of memory and the imagination.

[3] I’m a writer, not a scientist. I have followed developments in generative AI and the predictions for artificial general intelligence in publications like The New Yorker and the New York Review, and in books aimed at a general audience – not in scientific journals. Consequently, I might be way off the mark. However, having just listened to the latest episode of The Times and the Sunday Times podcast, The Story, about the AI actor Tilly Norwood, I’m not going to back down just yet.https://podcasts.apple.com/au/podcast/the-worlds-first-ai-actress-and-her-creator/id1501716010?i=1000737864964

ESSENTIALLY HUMAN. 

Memory, Imagination and creativity.

When I was eight years old, I had three ambitions. The first was to be a ballerina – more a matter of wishful thinking than creative passion, given I wanted to be tall and slim, I was keen to wear a tutu, and I longed to be borne aloft by men who resembled fairy-tale princes. That ambition soon disappeared, snuffed out by common sense and a maturing aesthetic. The second ambition was to be a novelist. For as long as I could remember, novels had provided a refuge from the crush and uncertainty of my child’s life – a very necessary refuge given that childhood and I were not an easy fit. Filled with anxiety that I was getting the child role wrong, and ever alert to any tools that might help me navigate those perilous years, I studied other children in order to learn the ropes. The price of such vigilance was inexhaustible exhaustion. I was watchful during the day, and the nights were spent analysing the previous day’s mistakes and planning protective strategies for the next. The most reliable respite I had from this anxiety was not sleep (with so much to do I was a poor sleeper) but novels. I would slip into other lives and other places and relieved of my deficient yet demanding self, I would feel stimulated, invigorated, engaged, even happy – although like Samuel Beckett, I discovered that happiness was not as lively as I would have thought. Fiction supported me through the seemingly endless years of childhood, and from a young age I was determined to become a novelist. 

That I had decided to be a writer of novels could be explained in terms of the pleasure principle, self-preservation and escape. But I couldn’t escape all the time so what I needed was a reliable means of holding life in place. This need shaped my third ambition, namely, to have a perfect memory, the sort of memory that could learn poems by heart, that could reel off a page of numbers briefly glimpsed, that never forgot a person, place, event or story. If I could remember everything that had ever happened to me in the past, I would better manage the troubles that plagued my present, and gain a grip on the uncertain future.

My concept of memory in those long-ago days was akin to memorising. And I did so love memorising – poems, psalms, one year the entire geography book (I disliked geography but memorising the book as I walked around a deserted tennis court had a pleasing, hypnotic effect). In one respect, memorising was similar to reading in that both activities, by capturing my entire attention, removed me from the trials of childhood and my burdensome self. But that was the only similarity. Reading invigorated me, it sparked my imagination; I would travel to times and places not my own, and mix with people not to be found anywhere in suburban Melbourne. In contrast, my childhood memorising filled the time with a vaguely narcotic calm – like doing Lego or jigsaws or painting by numbers.[1]

To be a novelist and to have perfect memory: two linked ambitions to help steer me through the bewildering world in which I found myself, and through primary and secondary school they sustained me well. It was during my first year at university that I realised my dual ambitions were incompatible. I read The Mind of a Mnemonist, written by the great Russian neurologist, A.R. Luria, a book detailing the extraordinary memory of a man called ‘S’. This was followed a couple of months later by Borges’s Labyrinths, most especially, the short story, ‘Funes the Memorious’. Funes, an ordinary man in most respects, remembered everything; he could neither select nor forget. Beset by details, filled with details, Funes’s imagination was stifled. He was a man incapable of ideas or insight.

 ‘S’ and Funes demonstrated extraordinary feats of memory, like remembering pages of numbers or lists of nonsense syllables or poems in foreign languages, or the foreign language itself. Funes, for example, learned Latin in a week by memorising the Latin of Pliny the Elder as written in Pliny’s Naturalis Historia. But in  both cases this sort of memorising blocked the free-ranging imagination so essential to the novelist; it was a memory confined to particulars – a type of memory that excludes reflection and reason, inspiration and illumination. 

Novelists require a versatile, athletic imagination, one that can leap and loiter in the uncertainties of an emerging narrative. The novelist’s imagination is an explorer and thrill seeker. Perfect memory of the sort to which my childhood self had aspired is in service to safety and certainty; it is memory without imagination, it is memory at odds with metaphor, it is a memory as discreet and as immoveable as a picket fence. 

The memory that fuels human life and endeavour is far more creative than this. If I remember an event, say the breakup of an affair, it is not identical to the actual break-up. My recollection is overlaid with other experiences, other understandings, conversations, desires. Memory relies upon the recruitment of an entire cognitive landscape – experience, study, conversations, other memories. Just as Magritte’s painting of a pipe, Ceci n’est pas une pipe, so too my memory of the break-up, or, indeed, any memory. Memories are created, and what they recall is re-created differently with each recollection. 

This notion of memory is fluid and often illuminating. It is also unpredictable: we cannot determine beforehand what knowledge and experience will be pulled into play during recollection, nor the ideas that will emerge from the mix. And it is unreliable, too. As a photo is not the whole story, that there is, as Barthes wrote, a ‘blind field beyond the frame’; so too with memory. All memory involves partial forgetting, but what is forgotten is not erased, indeed, it is a common occurrence that, triggered by an experience in the present, a formerly forgotten element rises to consciousness. In addition to being unpredictable and unreliable, memory is not neutral. We select what is to be remembered, and depending on current circumstances, what is selected this year will be different from what will be selected next year or in ten years time. Memory is in service to the present far more than the past event it purports to preserve. Far from being solid and immutable, this memory we trust is both delicate and infinitely corruptible, it is also free-ranging and expansive, linking with a swill of experience, desire, emotion, understanding, doubts, values and attitudes. This notion of memory, this fertile and changing memory, this creative and illuminating memory, is one dependent on the imagination and in turn constructing it.[2]

We draw on memory to make sense of ourselves as we trek through daily life. It is memory that fuels imaginings of the future, it is memory that helps plan for it. It is memory that feeds the hopes and desires that drive us to seek out this person and abruptly turn from another. It is memory that seeds great art, composes memorable music, writes heart-stopping poetry and life-changing novels. A life without imagined, creative memory has been described by great neuroscientists like Luria, and it is a life confined in an ever-present where nothing much changes and art is indistinguishable from dust. A life without imagined, creative memory would be, for most of us, unbearable.

And yet it seems we are heading straight into that darkness.

Memory, imagination and creativity require a few simple conditions: uninterrupted time, solitude, no external distractions and the ability to sustain attention and focus.

In the digital age, for many, perhaps most people, simple factual memory – recall – of a name, a book or a film, has been rendered vestigial by web searches. Stop, I say, when someone reaches for their phone because they can’t remember the name of a book, an actor, a film. Stop, I say, give your mind time, give it space, the name will come to you. Mostly the person does not stop, does not wait. What would be the point? they imply, with a nod at their phone. Indeed, we have adapted so quickly to having information at our fingertips that when we want to know something, we want to know it now, whether it be the closest bagel shop (with pictures to show if the bagels are authentic), or a video clip of the admirable Jonas Kauffman singing Andrea Chenier (there is); it doesn’t matter what the nature of the information, we expect to have it immediately. 

Skills, which once were ubiquitous, have been lost. It would be a rare millennial or post-millennial who could read a map, but neither would they regard this as a loss Why bother, when they have GPS? And simple mathematical calculations – multiplying, division, percentages – these calculations would be beyond many people. But again, why bother, when you always have a calculator in reach? 

The history of human progress is also the history of lost skills. Few people these days would know how to rub sticks together to produce fire. Few people would know how to build a fire in a grate; quite a few people would not know what a grate is. And who would know how to read a sundial these days? But the loss of fire-making skills or telling the time by the sun, or reading a map, or doing simple maths do not diminish our humanness: they do not fundamentally alter what it is to be human.

Creativity is in a different sphere, creativity is essentially human. In our switched-on, digital world, sustained attention on a single idea, problem or issue has been lost to the dings and clicks of social media, news feeds, email, texts. Turn off notifications and that little screen still flashes. Solitude has being shoved aside by the need for constant connection and approbation. Checking a phone every few minutes is akin to laboratory rats pressing a lever for food, knowing that eventually they will be rewarded. So, too, with social media.

The mobile phone is the metaphorical heart beat of the modern individual. We sleep with it, run with it, eat with it. It accompanies us to the bathroom, it’s in reach while we have sex. It is a common sight to see two people seated together in a café each occupied with their phone, the only communication occurring when one shares their screen with the other. With WIFI blanketing the earth, even in wilderness landscapes the digital heart beats strongly. There is no repose. There is no time to mull in your own thoughts, to reach into the troughs of forgetting, there is no time for the imagination to flourish. 

Multi-tasking has inflamed the situation. Attention spans have not shortened in the digital age, but the nature of attention has changed. Juggling several tasks simultaneously is counter-productive to the singular attention – the obsessiveness –that creative work requires. With solitude and privacy under assault, and sustained attention of the sort the imagination requires fast going the way of the typewriter and the tape cassette, the conditions for creative work are being steadily eroded. 

Creative skills are surprisingly frail. As a writer, I know that when I return to my desk after just a few weeks away, the words don’t come so easily, the ideas are sluggish or, worse, non-existent. It takes a few days for the creative skills to muscle up again. The imagination, if neglected, readily becomes dormant; if it is not nurtured, it can actually decay. Muscles that are unused become stiff and painful and thereby draw attention to themselves. Unfortunately, the imagination goes far more quietly.

Running alongside this assault on human creative processes is the vast and increasingly complex advances in Generative Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence. Generative AI has been designed with the capacity to learn and develop new data from its own actions/work, while Artificial General Intelligence is human-level intelligence that can do everything the human mind can do – and more.

An example of Generative AI was portrayed in a 2016 Go tournament between Lee Sedol, the world champion at the time, and the computer programme AlphaGo. Demis Hassabis, the scientist who produced the early work linking the neurological substrates of imagination and memory, was the primary creator of AlphaGo.[3]  

There were good reasons to choose Go to test the limits of the AlphaGo computer. There had been many AI-versus-human chess tournaments, but Go is far more complex than chess and, for seasoned players, creativity and intuition play a role. Many players speak about the game in quasi-spiritual terms. This spiritual dimension combined with the role of intuition underscore Go as a distinctly human-grounded game. 

AlphaGo demonstrated a level of self-learning in the tournament with Lee Sedol that even surprised its creators. One particular move, move 37 in the second game, was described by one Go Master as ‘not a human move’ but ‘beautiful, so beautiful’. This move had not been a part of AlphaGo’s programmed memory, rather the machine had created it.

Sedol lost the tournament 4 to 1 and, not long after, he resigned from the professional circuit. Since then other programs to play Go have been developed that are even more capable than AlphaGo. 

Generative AI is already with us, and artificial general intelligence with its open-ended creative skills is fast developing. There are daily warnings of the dangers of AI, including some from the founders in the field.[4] There are worries expressed over AI-written student essays and AI-generated novels, but there are far more serious concerns over the possibility of AI surpassing human intelligence and subjugating we humans. 

Whatever the future brings, it has already begun, and running in parallel has been the erosion of the very skills needed to maintain control of our human future. In our eagerness to embrace all the digital world has to offer, we have neglected to take stock of what we have complacently relinquished. Human imaginative work runs the risk of dying out, and with artificial general intelligence, creativity will become the province of the machines that human imagination and ingenuity produced. In short, we are creating the conditions of our own demise. AI isn’t taking over human creative endeavour, we have already ceded the territory.


[1] This childhood memorising is very different from the memorising of my adult years when, consciously and fully alert, I have worked to absorb poems and quotable quotes into the fabric of mind. As George Steiner memorably wrote: ‘To learn by heart is to afford the text or music an in-dwelling clarity and life-force…What is committed to memory and susceptible of recall constitutes the ballast of the self.’ (Steiner. Real Presences. pp 9-10).

[2] In recent years, the correlation between memory and the imagination has been given a neuroscientific basis. Demis Hassabis, neuroscientist, all-round genius, and winner of the 2023 Nobel Prize of Chemistry, published a paper in 2007 in which he linked memory and the imagination. He revealed that similar brain activity occurred during tasks employing memory of the past and tasks requiring an imagining of the future, and both were grounded in the hippocampus. Since then, much further work has been done in the neurological connections of memory and the imagination.

[3] An excellent account of the tournament is the documentary, AlphaGo, directed by Greg Kohs, and available on YouTube. Also Benjamin Labatut in his brilliant, unorthodox novel MANIAC, devotes the last chapters to the game of Go, in particular, this tournament between Lee Sedol and AlphaGo. 

[4] In his book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow, Yuval Noah Harari analyses recent advances in AI and what they may mean for the future of humankind. The book was published in 2016, developments (some would prefer the term ‘progress’) since then are cause for far greater concern.

RELICS FROM THE PAST

(Published in THE MONTHLY, September, 2025)

On an Autumn day in Melbourne not so long ago, while travelling home on the train, I was caught by a scent. It wafted over from a woman seated across the aisle. Her hair was short and blow-waved neat, her coat was buttoned, her handbag was upright against her hip; she was a woman in her middle years, occupied with her phone. I willed her not to disembark until I had found the memory of the smell. It was teasingly familiar, yet I knew it lodged in the distant past. I inhaled more deeply and felt a flush of happiness. A moment later, the happiness was swamped by a wave of anxiety and longing.

What was that smell? I rummaged through memory, but despite the powerful feelings it engendered, the original source remained out of reach. 

The woman slipped her phone into her bag, stood up and moved to the door; soon she would be gone. I wanted to grab her, hold her back till the scent revealed itself. The train slowed, the platform of the station appeared, then, just before the doors opened, it came to me: it was hairspray, the Elnett hairspray my mother used to helmet her hair back in the 1960s. (I would normally avoid turning a noun into a verb, but the hairspray did, in fact, make of her hair a helmet, and it did so actively enough to warrant a verb.)

I had solved the mystery of the smell, but I was curious about its emotional baggage.  

My mother died in 2012. Twenty years earlier, while in her mid-sixties, her cognitive skills began to dwindle. In the last eight years of her life, she recognised none of her family; in the last three years of her life, she could neither walk nor talk. Before the dementia, and probably because I was more like her than were my sister and brother, my relationship with my mother was not easy. I spent my childhood trying to win her approval, or perhaps, more simply, her attention. I would stand beside her as she sat at her dressing table, one of those old-fashioned ones with a central mirror and two side wing mirrors – three versions of my mother as she teased her thin hair and stiffened it with Elnett hairspray. The last element of her beauty regime was to apply perfume to her neck and behind her ears – it was Je Reviens by Worth in a small round blue bottle – then she would turn to me, silent and desperately hopeful, and dab some of the perfume behind my ears. The anxiety and longing disappeared in a moment of pure happiness.

Smells and memory, such a powerful, yet mysterious coupling. I can bring to mind something visual, I can imagine a voice or a piece of music from the past, but I cannot imagine a smell – nor, with a nod to Proust, taste. But perhaps such considerations are moot, given the capriciousness and capaciousness and plain bloody-mindedness of memory. After all, each time memory summons up a particular past it produces a different version. The life since the event changes the perspective on the past event, as do the reasons for wanting to recall it. Memory is always in service, first and foremost, to the present and not the event it seeks to restore. I may not be able to recall a smell or taste in the way I can a picture, a face or a piece of music, but the fact is, no memory is faithful to the past.

And yet, there was that raw longing, that look-at-me ache, conjoined with the Elnett hairspray. It was primitive, juvenile, it served no purpose, so I wanted to believe, to the adult I have become. It was of then, and it trespassed into my now.

I was nineteen or twenty when I first came across Sartre’s 1964 memoir of his childhood, Words  (Les Paroles). I was immediately drawn to it because of the cover of my Penguin edition. Instead of the usual image, the cover carries a quote from the book in a huge font: ‘I loathe my childhood and all that remains of it…’ 

I shared this sentiment – I still do, although with a little less vehemence than Sartre. But what most appealed was that a very famous person dared contradict the assumed innocence and care-free quality that defined childhood.

I wanted to pack childhood away as soon as it was finished, but childhood will not go so quietly; indeed, I’ve come to believe that childhood claims the better part of memory for itself. Miserable or happy, privileged or deprived, pivotal aspects of childhood are tenaciously entrenched. Yet, as my experience with the Elnett hairspray demonstrates, these memories can hibernate beyond conscious reach for years, even decades, only to bombard as you make your way through maturity.

There’s nothing new about this: a century ago, Freud revealed that the ignored past, the forgotten past, the past of which you are unconscious, can nonetheless exert a powerful effect on who you are and how you behave. And yet we live, most of the time, as if unaware of being tethered to the past, and when old events gate-crash the present they result in surprise and shock, they can readily throw you off balance. 

These thoughts led me back to Walter Benjamin’s essay on Proust. Benjamin writes of ‘purposive remembering’ with its strenuous efforts to recollect and, in the case of A la recherche du temps perdu, to imaginatively restore the past. ‘Purposive remembering’ suggests that a reconstruction of the past is possible. But it’s not, and why imagination is essential to memory – not simply to fill in the gaps, but also to provide the multi-dimensions of lived experience: the facts, the movements, the emotions, the smells and tastes

In the days following the Elnett hairspray event, I mulled over the liquid connections between imagination and memory. Joyce wrote that ‘Imagination is memory’; I would propose the reverse: that memory is imagination – not the entire infinite stretch of the imagination but rather memory is a process of the imagination.[1] The idea that memory is fused with the imagination, that all memories are distilled in the imagination, provides for the malleability of memory. The fact is that when I focus my mind on the child standing at her mother’s dressing table now, I understand the situation slightly differently than I did just a few weeks ago, feel it differently, and know it differently, too.

There was a postscript to the Elnett hairspray incident. Driven by nostalgia (definitely not curiosity) I went on-line and discovered that the perfume my mother used, Worth’s Je Reviens, was still being produced and was available from a shop in the Melbourne CBD. (As to why the perfume and not the hairspray: I use perfume every day, but have no need for hairspray). I caught the train to the city, I went to the shop. The perfume came in two sizes, each sealed in the familiar blue box. I bought the large bottle – far better value, according to the woman in the perfume shop, but that was not what convinced me: I assumed my mother, who used the perfume every day, would have used the large version (even though in my memory the round blue bottle was quite small). But I was wrong. When I removed the perfume from the box the bottle was the right shape and the familiar rich blue colour, but it was far too big. My mother used the small size – which, I expect, was the only size available back in those long-ago days. I was so disappointed, I was wanting exactly the same, I was wanting to revisit exactly that old scene. To experience it again. Fortunately, the scent had not changed. I put some on my wrists, I wanted to keep smelling it, smelling the better part of a difficult childhood. 

The headache began almost immediately, first the shadow that presages the pain, then the pain itself which, in most instances will morph into migraine. There are many perfumes that do this to me, but surely not Je Reviens

I persisted – I so wanted to wear this perfume – but so did the migraine. I gave the bottle to my sister. And the memory? It has changed again.


[1] in 2007, a team led by Demis Hassabis published a paper in which memory and the imagination were linked. They showed that similar brain activity occurred during tasks employing memory of the past and tasks requiring an imagining of the future, both being grounded in the hippocampus. Since then, much further work has been done on the neurological connections of memory and the imagination.

DEAD AND BURIED

Hardly anyone dies these days. They pass away, or simply pass. But to where? I wonder. What Bali-afterlife or Tahitian-Elysian Fields is awaiting them? 

For believers, I expect the answer is heaven, hell or purgatory. But for those of us who have dispensed with the religious afterlife, where do the ‘dearly departed’ go when they are said to pass away?

The nonsense doesn’t stop here. 

After a person has ‘passed away’ they are then ‘laid to rest’. For those who have been cremated, a bowl of ashes whether cast to the winds or stashed in a mausoleum niche, cannot possible signify rest. And there is nothing restful about the dark interior of an over-priced coffin where the body gradually rots. As for the incorporeal soul, unburied and unburned, there is no proof whatsoever of its existence as anything other than a poetic trope. 

The issue here is of course death, or rather, DEATH. It’s such a terrifying prospect that the very mention of it – death, dying, dead – is shunned. Death is so abhorrent that a new area of medicine that regards death as a treatable illness – euphemistically titled ‘regenerative medicine’ – has recently emerged in the United States. I cannot imagine anything more horrible than a world filled with very old, very rich people with plastic skin and stem-cell and/or digitally-produced organs who spend their life in the time-consuming and very expensive pursuit of not dying.

So many euphemisms to escape death – but not, I would suggest, particularly effective in easing the widespread death-fear. In my 1986 Macquarie Thesaurus, ‘Living’ and ‘dying’ are both key words, but the entry for ‘dying’ is twice as long as that for ‘living’: curtains, demise, sticky end, release, the dearly departed, casualties, the loved one, the fallen, the list goes on and on. So many ways of side-stepping the inevitable end. It’s as if the words themselves, dead and death, will tempt the evil eye and toss us in the ring with not-at-all easeful death. In the 2007 edition of the Macquarie Thesaurus, the keywords of ‘living’ and ‘dying’ have been replaced by ‘life’ and death’, and in the same nod to reality as the earlier edition, ‘death’ is more than twice as long as ‘life’. 

The Thesaurus notwithstanding, the preferred nomenclature, whether on reality TV, in the tabloid press, the ABC, the serious press or just general conversation is ‘passing away’. The best that can be said about ‘passing away’ is that it’s not as grating or as misleading as ‘pass’ and ‘passing’; after all ‘pass/passing’ can be used to refer to traffic, to a horse-race, to a person passing as someone they are not.

One reason for the widespread death-fear is that life is well, so vivacious, and the idea of not living, of not being here, of missing out on the future, is deeply distressing – like a fabulous party to which you were not invited. But the fact remains, as Epicurus pithily stated: Where life is, death is not. And where death is, life is not. And that is the immutable case whether amoeba, wombat, narwhal or human.

A possible solution to the death fear might be to down-grade life, to stop preferencing it over death. Henry James referred to life as a predicament before death, while Ted Hughes in his reworking of Euripides’ Alcestis wrote of death as the birth-cry/… the first cry of the fatally injured. Birth as a death sentence, and life as a rather engaging filling in time would place death as the goal of every moment, every experience, every love affair, a step closer to the finishing line of a long and stimulating Tour de Vivre winding through the Alps of life.

‘Passing away’ suggests a peaceful, easeful leave-taking, like a cloud floating out of sight. Cataclysmic death as a result of insurgencies or semi-automatic weapons or an aeroplane crashing into a skyscraper runs counter to the whole purpose of a euphemism like ‘passing away’. And as it happens, big death doesn’t shy away from the truth. 1000 dead. 3000 dead. No euphemisms here. And mass deaths that occur in numbers that defy comprehension (six million Jews dead in the Holocaust, nine hundred thousand Tutsis dead in  a single month in the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of Sudanese dying right now) also don’t shun the language of death. Similarly with large-scale natural disasters – earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, raging floods, prolonged droughts – where the dead number in the thousands and tens of thousands, no gentle passing away for them. Another exception to death evasion is the war dead – although after the fact: at the time of both world wars, there was a very particular protocol to be followed in reporting the war-dead. While those who have died in wars are often referred to as ‘the fallen’, more commonly the dead are spoken of as dead. Recently, I visited the Western Front and some of the several hundred cemeteries marking the deaths of the tens of thousands of young men killed there during the Great War. So many of these young men were ‘cannon fodder’ – a very evocative metaphor which adds a moral dimension to their deaths – and so different from the euphemism of ‘passing away’ that actually obscures death and drains it of meaning. But then, that’s what euphemisms do. 

It is death that is close, death in the hand, touchable death, that we shy away from; this is the death that doesn’t want to acknowledge itself. These deaths disrupt the weave of family of friendships of daily life, these deaths make living lesser. 

For the dead, death is the end. For the living, death is the great unknown, and, more uncomfortably, the great uncertainty. Death as the great uncertainty? An oxymoron if ever there was one. And yet death need not be so hard. I am an ardent stroller of cemeteries. All those epitaphs are like mini-biographies – the lives of strangers shared with you. And death has inspired great art and literature; from Dante and Shakespeare through to Dickens to contemporaries like Sandra Gilbert, Julian Barnes and Lisa Appignanesi, so many writers have sought to explore death, have portrayed its richness and complexity. And music too, more than 2000 requiems, and numerous smaller enlightenments like Mahler’s Kindertotenlieder (Songs on the Death of Children). These works of music, of painting of writing bring you up close to death.

            In 1973, Ernest Becker published The Denial of Death. It became a best seller. Becker showed why we deny death and why immortality was so attractive. I find myself wondering if Becker’s book was one of those unread bestsellers like Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of Time, because the denial, in the English-speaking nations of the west is more entrenched than ever, But if all these stupefying euphemisms were to be discarded, death might be seen not as a threat nor as the great fear to be avoided at all costs, but rather a fact of life,        

THE SIMULTANEOUS TIME ZONES OF LIFE

Recently I was in London. I am familiar with the city, indeed, next to Melbourne, London is the city I know best. I first visited as a 21-year-old and have returned perhaps a dozen times since, sometimes staying just week or two, other times for months.

On that first visit, in 1972, the King’s Road was still the King’s Road, indeed, the sixties, most of which I’d been too young to explore fully, were still very apparent in clothes, in music, in a loud fuck-you attitude to traditional institutions, in a ‘new left’ that still had a presence. Of course, within a couple of years, the prevailing belief of the 1960s that the personal was political would metamorphose into the personal growth and development movement. Indeed, by 1975, politics had almost entirely disappeared, and what Tom Wolfe termed the ‘Me Decade’ was in full swing. Instead of storming the barricades of the past and of privilege, ‘realising one’s potential’, ‘finding the real me’, ‘remodelling the self’ had become the raison d’être of a meaningful life. This trend was described as ‘the new alchemical dream’ and the ‘sweetest and vainest of pastimes’ by Tom Wolfe in his essay ‘The Me Decade’ – which still reads well, more than forty years on.

I lived in London for several months that first time. The plan had actually been to stay indefinitely, but a boyfriend in Melbourne and a lack of confidence in my own capacities brought me home within a year. But still I managed to cover a lot of ground. I walked the streets of London, I walked for hours, for days, and I walked alone. And I read. I read the existentialists finding a vocabulary for my own angst, I read books on the sociology of alienation, I read the soul-breakers of poetry, Baudelaire and Rimbaud (my brothers, my brothers) and I read Virago’s recently discovered feminists as well as George Eliot and Edith Wharton and many others.

It was a very solitary time. There was no one to disturb my reverie and no one on whom to test my thoughts. As I walked the London streets, my mind was alive: to the books I was reading, the people and scenes around me, as well as memories, longings and imaginings. It all mingled together, hard to separate the facts from fiction and both from desire. Not that I minded, I was never lonely in a George Eliot novel, I was never clumsy or misunderstood when a part of alienated youth, I was never shy or reticent in my imaginings.

On my latest trip, unlike the several that had preceded it, impressions from my first visit to London surfaced with particular vividness. In fact, there were times when I felt as if I were simultaneously living in different time zones, that now was also then, and, given my awareness and knowledge of this experience, much of the time in between. There were two factors that marked this trip as different: the first was a book – Julian Barnes’s first novel, Metroland – the second, an exhibition about the 1960s that was showing at the V&A.

Back in the old days before e-books and electronic readers, books would take up a good portion of my suitcase when I travelled. While I will always prefer reading a paper book to a screen, these days I travel with my iPad loaded up with both new and old titles (I never leave home, for example, without the complete works of Jane Austen), I travel with the equivalent of several suitcases of weightless books. But I was in London and staying around the corner from Daunts, and I simply could not resist.

For booklovers who don’t know Daunt Books in Marylebone put it on your list if you aredaunt-books-marylebone-high-st-london going to London. In the meantime, visit the Daunt Books website and take the virtual tour through this lovely Edwardian bookshop (make sure to check out all three floors). I found an essay by Brodsky on Venice that I’d not known about before, and a fat family memoir by Mary-Kay Wilmers, the editor of the LRB; I picked up a new Justin Cartwright, Lionheart, and Julian Barnes’s first novel, one of the few books of his I’d not read.

From the first page of Metroland, indeed, the first sentence I was hooked. ‘There is no rule against carrying binoculars in the National Gallery’ the novel begins. How could I not continue? Is there a rule about using binoculars, I wondered. And plunged ahead.

Metroland comes in a lovely edition, a ‘special archive edition’ according to the publishers (Vintage). It’s a paperback with folding flaps and a repeating graphic of stylized suburban houses on front and back, and inside both covers there’s a similar repeating graphic in a hot orange.

metroland-cover

 

 

metroland-inside-cover

 

 

 

 

 

 

The book begins in 1963 in Metroland, that area of London served by the Metropolitan line, when the narrator, Christopher, and his best friend Toni are 16 years old. Christopher and Toni are intellectuals, they’ve read books their fellow students have never even heard of, they pepper their conversation with French and they fancy themselves as modern-day flâneurs. And they assume that distanced, critical, somewhat superior stance of alienated youth. They are adamantly not of Metroland and will escape as soon as they can. The book is laugh-aloud funny at times, it is also very knowing.

For almost half the book the narrative stays with the boys in Metroland before shifting, along with Christopher, to Paris in 1968 – yes, that pivotal year, although unfortunately the upheavals (or, as Christopher refers to them in meaningful italics, les événements) seem to have passed him by. In the third section of the book the narrative shifts back to Metroland. Now it is 1977 and Christopher is a husband and father; he is far wiser and far happier (with neither shame not embarrassment) than his younger self.

I was captivated by the entire book, but it was the first section, the youth section, that had the major impact. I recognised those boys, not in every respect and certainly not in their fixation on sex, but in their reading and other intellectual pursuits and their sense of being different from their peers. (I wonder if all intellectual children of the second half of the 1900s gravitated to the same books.) Because there were two of them, they managed to legitimate the other and they often made light and merry of their difference. In my own case, I too met a like-minded girl in early adolescence. It’s much harder if you are alone. So I was infusing Metroland with my own experience, or Metroland was infusing my memories and I read and read and did not want the book to finish.

During this time I visited the 1960s exhibition at the V&A. The clothes, the bands, the books, the films and TV, the posters and badges, the personalities, how very familiar they all were. Best of all was a large room where a movie of Woodstock was playing, huge images covering the walls and cushions cast across the floor, and there I sat rocking along to the familiar music, gazing at those lovely familiar figures.

This entire exhibition was a banquet in identifying with the familiar. As I wandered the exhibition, I saw that most of the other on-lookers were around my age, and I saw the smiles on their faces, the pleasure of recognition, as they peered at the exhibits. I wasn’t the only one enjoying this trip to the past.

But was it the past? I was in the now, I was in the present. What I was recalling did not make me forget where I was, the pull of the past did not obliterate the present. Indeed, it was the past coming into the present, like red wine into water, a lovely mingling that softened and pleasured the present. (This is quite opposed to nostalgia, a deluded state that has you longing for a lost past.) This past was enriching the present, and the present was making more sense of the past. Simultaneous and merging time zones, I decided.

Often when explaining memory, metaphors from archaeology are evoked. So, for example, we read of the strata of time, the bedrock of events. These particular metaphorical associations are romantic in a nineteenth century type of way, but they are not accurate. The memories that burst upon us do so in a single moment, they are not sequential; simultaneously they operate together with one another and with current events. There’s nothing linear or strata’d about it.

Our sense of time is that it flows inexorably forward while now, this moment, does not. Now, this moment, if you could only hold on to it, is stationary. Now is what we experience. But for it to become experience, something reflected on, something that can be drawn upon in the future, it is no longer now, but rather it becomes part of our stock of knowledge (surely, an aspect of memory), a sort of personal and portable library.

I was learning more about the past, more about now with the sixties of Metroland, the V&A exhibition, and I actually made my way down to King’s Road, the first time in years. The days passed as if inside a movie. Movies, like novels, toy with time, years can pass in a few pages, or from one scene to the next. We might see in a flick of hair or perhaps a facial grimace alerting us that a character has remembered something, in a novel we can actually know the character’s thoughts. We are of this time and we are of all our time. Each memory affects many that have gone before and will itself be affected by many that come afterwards. And all those memories are still active as we make our way through the often tumultuous currents of today.

IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING

I have always been captivated by the idea of memory. While it has been a theme in all my novels it was THE theme in The Memory Trap. In this novel, memory in all its forms – personal biographical memory, national collective memory, memory and obsession, mementoes and memorials – was explored through the lives of the characters.

ABR coverThe American writer and film-maker, David Rieff, has made memory the subject of his past two books. I have reviewed his latest for ABR and reproduce it below

This month’s ABR has a stunning cover to accompany the announcement of the 2016 Calibre essay prize to Michael Winkler. Check out the issue at

http://www.australianbookreview.com.au

 

 

 

IN PRAISE OF FORGETTING
David Rieff
Yale University Press, $36.95 hb, 145pp.
ISBN: 978-0-300-18279-8

Over the past three decades, and particularly since the prime ministership of John Howard, there has been an extraordinary growth in the number of young Australians making the pilgrimage to Gallipoli. Most of these people have no ancestors among the ‘fallen’, but rather are following what has become a rite of passage for patriotic young Australians.

Lest we forget, they intone. But what exactly is being remembered? And to what purpose is it being used? After all, until recently, few young people visited the site of this appalling military failure in which Australians were used as cannon fodder by their colonial masters. For that matter, until recently, flag-waving nationalism and loud-mouthed patriotism played little part in any aspect of Australian life.

Memory and its more structured form as remembrance are considered to be positive and desirable attributes. Personal memory is thought to be the primary vehicle by which individuals define themselves, while collective memory helps define a nation. Collective memories, like Gallipoli, act as the struts and foundations of nationalism, uniting poor and rich, urban and rural populations alike. As for history and memory, they are regarded – if thought about at all – as almost exactly the same, rather like identical twins.

In his excellent new book, In Praise of Forgetting*, David Rieff questions the commonly unquestioned: namely the purposes and effects of collective memory. He shows how easily history can fall prey to morally contingent, proprietorial and emotive memory. Ranging across the Irish troubles, the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide, Israel and Palestine, Stalin’s Russia, and the Balkans’ internecine battles Rieff reveals how collective memory invariably follows a political and ideological agenda, which is itself underpinned by specific moral imperatives. He makes clear that structured, state-sanctioned memorialising is in thrall to contemporary goals and aspirations and not the past it is purporting to preserve. As well, he points out ‘that exercises in collective historical remembrance far more closely resemble myth on one side and political propaganda on the other [more] than they do history.’ Rieff will always see the elephant in the room.

In advancing his arguments, Rieff draws on a wealth of work about memory and remembrance including that of the great Russian neurologist A.R. Luria, the Polish poet and essayist Czeslaw Milosz, Theodor Adorno’s classic Minima Moralia, and most particularly the Israeli political philosopher Avishai Margalit (The Ethics of Memory) and the social philosopher Tzvetan Todorov (Hope and Memory and Memory as a Remedy of Evil). Rieff sets up a dialogue of sorts with these latter two luminaries in which there is acknowledgement and agreement, as well as argument and disagreement; crucially Rieff extends the analysis of both men. As a thinker, Rieff is fearless and devoid of sentimentality. To take on those you admire is a difficult task, but if done well, as it is in this book, it yields far richer and nuanced arguments than if you were to pit yourself against a thinker with a diametrically opposing view.

Individual memory degrades very quickly while official memorialising is a tool in service to ideological and cultural currents. Rieff refers to Shelley’s pithy ‘Ozymandias’, as well as David Cannadine’s memoir ‘Where Statues Go to Die’ about the ‘inglorious fate’ of colonial monuments in India. My favourite monument story concerns the Bremen Elephant. This ten foot high red brick elephant was erected in 1932 to celebrate Germany’s colonial conquests, especially in Namibia. By the 1980s this particularly brutal colonisation had become a matter of shame; the monument was an embarrassment and there were calls to pull it down. In 1990, when Namibia gained its independence, the Bremen Elephant was re-dedicated as an anti-colonial monument, and in 2009 a new monument was built adjacent to the old to commemorate the lives of those Namibians who perished in the colonisation. Rather than an enduring truth about the past, monuments rise and fall depending on prevailing political and social concerns.

Official remembrance is big business these days. New monuments, memorial gardens, entire museums are popping up all the time. Rieff is rightfully critical of a number of these, including the U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington DC, where the atrocities portrayed have been book-ended in kitsch. (For an excellent book on kitsch in memorialising see Marita Sturken’s Tourists of History, 2007.) My complaint with the U.S. Holocaust Museum is in its use of experiential exhibits. The underlying premise of this fashionable trend in museum practice is that by promoting a personal involvement in the (long-past) events being portrayed, visitors will be motivated towards a better understanding. So it happens that on entering the U.S. Holocaust Museum visitors are issued with an identity card of a real person who existed during the Holocaust. As you walk past the displays of horror, as you watch the videos, as you linger in the (real) cattle car, you clutch your identity card wondering if your person – your surrogate self, after all – has survived. You have been inserted into these horrendous events. As for the imagination as a means of understanding, it has fallen out of fashion. What this might mean for memory in general, given that memories involve an imagining of past events, is anyone’s guess.

Rieff, in highlighting past atrocities and the way they have influenced current conflicts, recommends forgetting as a means of facilitating individuals to move on. Many Holocaust survivors did exactly this. They had survived and it was incumbent on them to live fully – not only for themselves but the millions who were denied a future. They did not consult counsellors or psychiatrists, rather they drew on their own resilience and determination to separate from their terrible experiences and steer themselves into the future. In many instances, It was their children and grandchildren who insisted on dragging them back to Auschwitz. It seems that the parents’ very productive forgetting interfered with the children’s demands for remembrance – a peculiarly narcissistic remembrance. The therapeutic has indeed triumphed as the author’s father, the sociologist Philip Rieff, predicted in 1966.

Rieff sees more value in forgiveness than do I. I am of the belief that some acts and the policies that allow them to occur are unforgivable, such as the atrocities under apartheid, those committed by the Nazis, and the slaughter being carried out by ISIS now. Nelson Mandela recognised this when he established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and not a Truth and Forgiveness Commission. There can be understanding and reconciliation, there can be a future where past enemies live together in peace, and this can occur without having to forgive the unforgivable (and thereby act in bad faith).

In Praise of Forgetting explores the powerful and often brutal effects of the seemingly benign and beneficent processes of memory and remembrance. It forces scrutiny of what has long been complacently accepted. Over the past half century or so, there has been a sacralising of memory both at the personal and collective levels. For the former it has often lead to a life of victimhood, for the latter entrenched hatreds and shocking brutality. If remembering truly were so therapeutic then such undesirable outcomes would not occur with such distressing regularity.

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*In Praise of Forgetting grew out of an earlier monograph Against Remembrance (MUP, 2011). I am hoping Rieff is planning a third volume titled ‘Against Forgiveness’.